Implementation of DoS and DDoS attacks on cloud servers by Mahjabin, Sefat
Periodicals of Engineering and Natural Sciences
Vol. 6, No. 2, December 2018, pp. 148 – 158
Available online at: http://pen.ius.edu.ba
ISSN: 2303-4521
Implementation of DoS and DDoS Attacks on Cloud Servers
Sefat Mahjabin
Daffodil International University, Dhaka, Bangladesh
Article Info
Article history:
Received June 18, 2018
Revised November 29, 2018
Accepted December 13, 2018
Keyword:
Cloud Computing
DoS attack
DDoS attack
Phyton Scripts
ABSTRACT
Cloud environments face many threats as traditional corporate networks, but due to
the vast amount of data stored on cloud servers, providers become an attractive target.
Thus the security level of data on the cloud servers is always a key issue from prevent-
ing potential attacks. This paper intends to show a relatively easy way to implement a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack and/or a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
The used Phyton scripts like HULK or XML-RPC are able to make several hundred
requests to the server in short period of time. The HULK is better for DoS attack,
while XML-RPC is for pure DDoS attack. It is concluded that with proper tools and
applications, the access to the VM and DDoS can be implemented relatively easy way.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a revolutionary concept that offers a new way to access personal data and applications, which
are no longer located on the computer but in the cloud - which means that the program records and documentation
can be accessed from multiple devices, anytime and from different locations. As a result, user services in the
cloud can be better, faster and easier to use and modify. Unfortunately, nowadays the cloud environments face
many threats as traditional corporate networks. Nevertheless, due to the vast amount of data stored on cloud
servers, the providers become an attractive target. The severity of potential damage tends to depend on the
sensitivity of the data exposed. The Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
are well-known. The DoS attack typically uses one computer and one internet connection to flood a targeted
system or resource. The DDoS attack uses multiple computers and Internet connections to flood the targeted
resource. The DDoS attacks in cloud computing are also termed as Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS)
attacks, due to the substantial economic losses both from resource usage and business disruption. These losses
are directly proportional to the downtime incurred by the attack. In recent times, cloud computing has been
adopted across the globe to support the major information technology requirements of organizations from all
industry sectors. As highlighted in, majority of the organizations (> 87%) across the globe are using cloud
infrastructure to run their mission critical applications. This adoption trend is due to the profound resources and
availability of on-demand resources in the cloud. However, the emergence of cloud computing has also led to the
shift of DDoS attackers more towards the cloud driven services. More than 33% of the overall reported attacks
in year of 2015 were targeted towards cloud services [1]. In addition, cloud features are becoming attractive to
the attackers. Most of the reported DDoS attacks usually last between few minutes to few hours and some major
attacks may last few days to even weeks. A recent report on global DDoS attack reveals that close to a quarter
of current DDoS attacks target the application layer, and one-fifth of the HTTP DDoS attacks are HTTP GET
floods [2]. There are many recent DDoS attacks on cloud services among which the attacks on Amazon EC2
services, RackSpace and Linode are major incidents resulting into considerable service outages [3].
There are numerous interesting survey as well as research papers (e.g., [2,4–38]) available which include works
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related to DDoS attacks in various networks both from the perspective of attacks and solutions. Major motivation
behind DDoS attacks includes business rivalry, political ideology, and cyber war among countries. The most
common outcome of DDoS attacks is unavailability of target service. The unavailability causes many short
term and long term business and reputation losses, which are actually a set of consequences of the service
downtime [39]. There are various ways of implementing DoS and DDoS attacks. There are also various ways
of protecting servers from DoS and DDoS attacks. For examples, Lonea et al. [40] suggested a model to detect
and analyze DDoS attacks in cloud computing environments using Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [41]. But
the computational complexity [42] of DST increases exponentially with the number of elements in the frame
of discernment (e.g., a mass function goes 2n − 1 for n elements in the state). Hiziroglu et al. [43] proposed a
conceptual model of a cloud-based customer analytics tool for retail small and medium enterprises. Sabanovic
et al. [44] presented a comparative analysis of data formatting technology in AMF, JSON and XML, during
data transfer between client and server. Sharif et al. [45] implemented an exemplary parallelization of artificial
neural network training by dint of Java and its native socket libraries. Simpson et al. [46] proposed a solution
of DDoS attacks in computer networks considering an inter-domain collaboration scheme. Kolandaisamy et
al. [47] suggested a multivariant stream analysis approach to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks in vehicular Ad
Hoc networks. Chadd [48] described the kinds of DDoS attacks for past, present, and future. Bhardwaj et al. [49]
compared single tier and three tier infrastructure designs against DDoS attacks. Swain et al. [50] presented an
approach for DDoS attacks to discriminate the attack level and provided security for DDoS nodes in MANET.
This paper addresses an easy implementation of a DoS attack on servers and it shows that the cloud servers
have some protection against basic attacks. When it comes to larger DDoS attacks, the virtual machine (VM)
on those clouds can misbehave and fail. VM is based on computer architecture and provides functionality
(e.g., [51]) of a physical computer. The protection of VM on the cloud can be provided by some software
or simple blocking of the certain server connections. The blocking of those servers is very dangerous, since
the block can affect some the users trying to fetch their data or trying to get response from service without
intention of DoS attack. It is worth mentioning that implementations of both DoS and DDoS attacks are not
so difficult but due to lack of approval from appropriate authorities, we could not implement the XML-RPC
script wholly to any clouds and its VM. Thus this paper is limited to the implementation a DoS attack on
servers using HTTP Unbearable Load King (HULK) script1. Durakovic [52] explored historical aspects of
Design of Experiments (DOE) and provided state-of-the-art of DOE’s applications for guiding researchers how
to conceptualize, plan, conduct experiments, analyze, and interpret data. It is said that DOE was most popular
tool in scientific areas of medicine, engineering, biochemistry, physics, computer science and counts about 50%
of its applications compared to all other scientific areas [52]. Although recently DOE mathematical methodology
is using for planning and conducting experiments as well as analyzing and interpreting data obtained from the
experiments, in this paper DOE has not been considered because of widely lack of huge experimental data and
proper experimental permission from appropriate authorities. Consequently, the consideration of DOE has been
left for future study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2. delineates the implementation of DoS and DDoS attacks;
Section 3. reports the empirical results and our observations; and Section 4. concludes the work with few clues
for further investigation.
2. Implementation
This section briefly explains architecture of DDoS attacks and security measures against them. As a part of this
paper, an experiment will briefly explain how a DDoS attacked is performed in order to fully understand what
kind of process is it. After understanding DDoS, conclusions and logical solution to the problem and potential
breakout will potentially arise.
2.1. DoS attack using HULK script
To implement a DDoS attack from one machine, a script can be made in various programming languages. This
experiment uses Phyton as a language in which script is calling a request-response service multiple times in
1All experiments shown in this paper are performed legally and with proper permissions from appropriate authorities. Author of this
paper is not responsible for any loss or damage made whatsoever if the experiment is repeated.
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certain amount of time. The HULK script was originally developed as a proof-of-concept to illustrate how easy
it is to take down a web server. The HULK script works by opening a flood of HTTP GET requests to overwhelm
its target. The HULK script is unique in that every request has a random header and URL parameter value to
bypass a server’s caching engine. The Listing 1 demonstrates a part of HULK script which calls other methods.
It executes the final attack to the servers and keeps making request-response until master machine stops it.
Listing 1. Execution process of HULK script in Python (hulk.py).
1 # e x e c u t e
2 i f l e n ( s y s . a r g v )<2:
3 usage ( )
4 s y s . e x i t ( )
5 e l s e :
6 i f s y s . a r g v [ 1 ] == ” h e l p ” :
7 usage ( )
8 s y s . e x i t ( )
9 e l s e :
10 p r i n t (”−− HULK A t t a c k S t a r t e d −−”)
11 i f l e n ( s y s . a r g v ) == 3 :
12 i f s y s . a r g v [ 2 ] == ” s a f e ” :
13 s e t s a f e ( )
14 u r l = s y s . a r g [ 1 ]
15 i f u r l . c o u n t ( ” / ” ) == 2 :
16 u r l = u r l + ” / ”
17 m = r e . s e a r c h ( ” h t t p \ : / / ( [ ˆ / ] * ) / ? . *” , u r l )
18 h o s t = m.group ( 1 )
19 f o r i i n r a n g e ( 5 0 0 ) :
20 t = HTTPThread ( )
21 t . s t a r t ( )
22 t = Moni to rThread ( )
23 t . s t a r t ( )
The targeted site was firstly checked is it responsible and does it works without any DoS attacks. The site was
available for several servers. Consequently, it was ready for testing. Figure 1 represents the response from
target website to host servers. All sensitive links in the images are blocked with red color for security reason.
After finishing the checkup, the target has been attacked with HULK script. The HULK script that is making
requests is doing while() do loop, which means it is attacking all the time. Figure 2 demonstrates HULK script
performing in the command prompt commands. After the attack it is notable that the website is not responding.
This indicates that the HULK script made out target server go down. To make sure that nobody can access the
server, the check was made once more from host server list. The conclusion is that nobody can access the site
anymore. Figure 3 depicts the host server list after a DoS attack.
2.2. Cloud servers with DoS attack
A cloud server is a logical (rather than a physical) server that is built, hosted, and delivered through a cloud
computing platform over the internet. Billions of Internet of Things (IoT) devices are connected via internet.
The IoT cloud service creates excessive communication between inexpensive sensors (e.g., [53]) in the IoT.
However, the cloud servers possess and exhibit similar capabilities and functionality to a typical server. But
the cloud servers are accessed remotely from a cloud service provider. The cloud server hosting services are
provided by multiple connected servers that comprise a cloud. The advantages of cloud server include: (i)
Onsite hardware and capital expenses are not needed; (ii) Best fit for smaller companies which would outgrow
storage too quickly; (iii) The costs of the data recovery would outweigh the benefits for companies which are
not as dependent on uptime and instant recovery.
It is interesting to know what happens in cloud servers with DoS attacks. The HULK script attack will be
applied to several cloud servers. To understand the way how the script is attacking, an example is given hereby.
As targeted site was attacked from Master PC, and then from remote server it has to go down as request from
larger servers were to trying multiple times to access relatively small server. Similarly, for attacking the cloud
servers, we would need a bigger amount of machines performing attack on cloud so that they will go down.
Figure 4 shows how this script is unable to perform any damage to cloud servers in general. It is clear that script
was not able to do anything to the clouds themselves, as the google.bd and google.com and facebook.com and
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Figure 1. Testing target responses before a DoS attack.
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Figure 2. Applying HULK script for a DoS attack.
amazon.com did not reply to attack. This protection is actually not a real protection as this server is just prepared
for this amount of requests. As the data clouds are having hundreds of requests each second, this little peak
does nothing to the cloud server. Nevertheless, this is not the case if we would have access to certain VM and
penetrate directly to it. The VM has limitations and has a maximum workflow. Consequently, it would not stand
DoS attacks. The HULK script was not applied to any cloud VM as there was no direct access to cloud VM.
2.3. XML-RPC DDoS attack
Unlike XML-RPC DDoS attack, HULK script is not using multiple servers (server list) as a zombie army for
attack. The Hulk is rather attack from few or few dozen machines. XML-RPC DDoS attack is more complicated
and more dangerous for web servers and clouds. Most of the people are unfamiliar with the concept of the
XML-RPC DDoS attack. The main misunderstanding is that one of the most famous web-site makers is the
holder of the script that is attacking servers. Unlike the opinion of some people that it is some list of pirated
servers that is holding those scripts. Namely WordPress websites are holding XML-RPC script which can be a
part of a larger network of DDoS attack. XML-RPC is a simple, portable way to make remote procedure calls
over HTTP. It can be used with Perl, Java, Python, C, C++, PHP, and many other programming languages. The
WordPress, Drupal and most content management systems support XML-RPC. This HTTP call can be repeated
multiple times thus make a DDoS attack. Taking into consideration that there are dozen millions of WordPress
impact of the of the attack of so many machines cannot be fully understood. As a security measure, there is a
way to prevent this misuse. Raising awareness of WordPress users that their services can misused. This will just
prevent other machines to misuse that server/website for further DDoS attacks as some of the users can choose
another platform for their website. Secondly, WordPress (WP) using XML-RPC should manually prevent the
misuse. The simple script provided in Figure 5 will prevent misuse with XML-RPC API.
3. Empirical Results and Observations
In this section, the experimental results along with our observations of this study have been presented. Cloud
environments always face unlimited mumbler of the threats. But due to the vast amount of data stored on cloud
servers the providers become an attractive target. The main reasons behind the DDoS attacks include business
rivalry, political ideology, and cyber war among countries. The most common outcome of DDoS attacks is
unavailability of target service. The unavailability causes many short term and long term business and reputation
losses. The DDoS attacks often cause a data breach. Thus companies may incur fines or they may face lawsuits
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Figure 3. Testing target responses after a DoS attack.
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Figure 4. Testing cloud servers with DoS attack.
Figure 5. DDoS defense in cloud.
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Figure 6. IP addresses and web pages hosting XML-RPC API and behaving as a zombie in DDoS attacks.
or criminal charges. Breach investigations and customer notifications can rack up significant costs. Indirect
effects, such as brand damage and loss of business, can impact organizations for years. Thus security level of
the data on the cloud servers will always be the cardinal concern.
Our study intended to show the security level of the cloud servers. The experiments in our study are relatively
easy to implement a DoS or DDoS attack. Phyton scripts like HULK or XML-RPC are able to make several
hundred requests to the server in short period of time. HULK script made HTTP requests for the server which
was immediately unresponsive for all other requests. The amount of the requests made the server block and
hold all incoming request as it was unable to respond due to request flood. This resulted in failure of the certain
domain that is tested and the server was down. Tested domain was located on private server with small or no
protection level. The machine that was holding this web page can be seen as VM on the cloud, if there is access
to a VM in the cloud. It would be relatively easy to apply the script to it and the result with the same outcome
could be expected. Unlike HULK script, XML-RPC is using a server list of available machines that are making
multiple requests to the server. HULK is rather DoS than DDoS attack, while XML-RPC is pure DDoS attack
as it sends request for its hosts to attack the certain domain. This is the main difference between the HULK and
XML-RPC. XML-RPC can be much more efficient when it comes to flooding, making server to be unavailable
and breaking the server down. Figure 6 depicts the IP addresses and web pages hosting XML-RPC API and
behaves as a zombie in DDoS attacks. As those lists are available on the internet, the easiest protection of VM
could be limitation of those servers and IP addresses. Putting those servers could easily block penetration to the
VM and hence block the DDoS attacks. Based on our observations, the accessing of VM on the cloud can be
as easy as the first experiment in this study - attacking the standalone server with Hulk script. Thus it can be
concluded that with proper tools and applications, access to the VM and DDoS can be implemented relatively
easy. As there are records of those attacks, it can be seen that XML-RPC script is doing its job very effectively.
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The target VM goes down just like the standalone server. Consequently, the protection of the VM of the clouds
can be improved. The target VM cannot protect itself from the pingback attack of the XML-RPC API’s. This
should be done by the cloud which should regulate the high slope of the unexpected requests.
It is noteworthy that we did not implement the XML-RPC script to any clouds and its VM since we had no
approval to implement the experiment to any cloud and VM. It is an excellent idea to take into account the DOE
mathematical methodology. Nowadays, DOE is using for planning and conducting experiments, analyzing, and
interpreting data. But due to lack of huge experimental data and proper experimental permission from appropriate
authorities, the consideration of DOE has been left for future investigation.
4. Conclusion
An easy implementation of DoS attack was performed using HULK script in Python. The used script is able to
make several hundred requests to the server in short period of time. The HULK script is good for DoS attack,
while XML-RPC goes pure for DDoS attack. With proper tools and applications, the access to the VM and DDoS
can be implemented in a relatively easy way. The implementation of the XML-RPC script was not performed
entirely due to lack of permission, and henceforth the future work would implement the XML-RPC script to any
clouds and corresponding VM.
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